

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P 221556Z JUL 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1717

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0414

EXDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS OF
JULY 19, 1976

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: SOVIET REPS KHESTOV, TARASOV, AND SHUSTOV MET WITH US REP AND DEPREP ON JULY 19 AT SUGGESTION OF US REP FOR END-OF-ROUND DISCUSSION. THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION, KHESTOV EMPHASIZED TWO MAIN THEMES. THE FIRST WAS THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIETS FOR EFFECTIVE STAGE ONE GUARANTEES FROM NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND STAGE. WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL RECOLLECT THAT THIS WAS THE MAIN THEME OF SOVIET APPROACH IN THE SPRING ROUND, WHEN THE SOVIETS TRIED TO TRADE IT OFF AGAINST THEIR AGREEMENT TO TABLE DATA, AND IT HAS CONTINUED TO BE THE MAIN EASTERN THEME DURING THE PRESENT ROUND. BEHAVIOR OF SOVIET REPS DURING THE JULY 19 DISCUSSION AS WELL AS IN SUBSEQUENT SHORTER DISCUSSIONS ON JULY 20 AND 21 (DETAILS SEPTTEL) AND DURING INFORMALS WOULD INDICATE THAT THE EAST MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RELAX THEIR REQUIREMENT THAT THE BETWEEN THE PHASE FREEZE BE ON A NATIONAL CEILING BASIS AND POSSIBLY ALSO REQUIRED THAT NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COMMIT THEMSELVES IN A
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STAGE ONE AGREEMENT TO TAKE THEIR STAGE TWO REDUCTIONS IN THE

FORM OF UNITS.

2. THE SECOND ISSUE STRESSED BY KHESTOV IN JULY 19 CONVERSATION AND OTHER SOVIET REPS THROUGHOUT ROUND WAS INEQUITY OF WESTERN DEMAND THAT SOVIETS REDUCE A TANK ARMY WHILE US, AND APPARENTLY OTHER ALLIES AS WELL WOULD INSIST ON MAKING THEIR REDUCTIONS BY INDIVIDUALS. KHESTOV SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE EQUITABLE IF EACH SIDE WERE TO WITHDRAW UNITS OF SMALLER SIZE LIKE BRIGADES.
END SUMMARY.

3. KHESTOV SAID HE WANTED TO SUMMARIZE THE PAST ROUND AND TO THINK OVER WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO MOVE THE TALKS AHEAD. AT THE END OF THE PAST ROUND, US REPS HAD SAID THAT ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EAST TABLING DATA. KHESTOV AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD REPORTED THAT THE US DELEGATION WAS DEEPLY INTERESTED IN THE EAST TABLING DATA AND THAT THE WEST HAD OFFERED TO TABLE DATA TOO IF THE EAST DID SO. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD HAD TO MAKE A STRONG EFFORT TO MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIET LEADERS THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE SOVIETS TO TABLE DATA: THIS HAD NOT BEEN EASY IN MOSCOW, WHERE MANY THOUGHT DIFFERENTLY. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD FINALLY BEEN SUCCESSFUL. BUT THIS STEP HAD BEEN TAKEN IN THE EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS AND WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES TO DEPART FROM THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS AND MOVE FORWARD. ONE OF THE MAIN FACTORS IN FAVOR OF THIS DECISION, AS VIEWED IN MOSCOW, HAD BEEN THAT THE US DELEGATION ATTACHED SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THIS MOVE. AS US REPS WOULD RECOLLECT, THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN MANY BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS.

4. KHESTOV SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO STRESS THIS ASPECT FURTHER BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO TELL US REPS HOW BOTH THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND MOSCOW ASSESSED THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. FOLLOWING THE WEST'S DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL, ON FEBRUARY 19, THE EAST HAD MADE A MOVE TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION. SOVIET REPS WERE AWARE THE WEST MIGHT ASSESS THIS MOVE DIFFERENTLY. SOMETIMES WESTERN REPS SAID THIS MOVE WAS MERELY OF PROCEDURAL SIGNIFICANCE. BUT FOR THE SOVIETS, THIS MOVE HAD BEEN A SERIOUS AND IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION. SOVIET REPS ALSO CONSIDERED
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THAT, BY TABLING EASTERN DATA ON JUNE 10, THEY HAD ALSO MOVED TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION. ALTHOUGH SOVIET REPS CONSIDERED IT PREMATURE TO TABLE FIGURES AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY HAD TAKEN THIS STEP IN ORDER TO MEET THE CONCERNS AND INTERESTS OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AND TO PROMOTE GREATER PROGRESS, AS WELL AS TO MAKE THE DISCUSSION MORE CONCRETE. THUS IN RECENT MONTHS, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD TAKEN CERTAIN DEFINITE STEPS TOWARD THE WESTERN POSITION IN ORDER

TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RAPPROACHMENT OF THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES
AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTIONS.

5. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT SOVIET REPS HAD A DIFFERENT
PICTURE WHEN THEY ASSESSED THE WESTERN POSITION IN THE LAST
ROUND. WHEN EASTERN REPS HAD FINALLY MOVED TO AGREE TO REDUCE
SOVIET FORCES IN THE FIRST STAGE, THEY HAD CONSIDERED ON
THE BASIS OF PAST DISCUSSION THAT A FIRM GUARANTEE AND SOLID
ASSURANCE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND
STAGE. BUT DISCUSSION IN THE PRESENT ROUND HAD GIVEN RISE TO A
DIFFERENT IMPRESSION. WESTERN REPS HAD TRIED TO PROVE THAT
THE GENERAL COMMITMENTS THE EAST HAD PROPOSED WERE SPECIFIC
COMMITMENTS. BUT THIS WAS JUST A GAME OF WORDS. THE MOST IMPORTANT
ISSUE WAS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOW PREPARED TO REDUCE THEIR
TROOPS IN A FIRST STAGE, BUT ONLY IF THEY HAD A FIRM
ASSURANCE THAT IN THE SECOND STAGE THE WEST EUROPEANS AND
CANADIANS WOULD ACTUALLY REDUCE. BUT THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION
IN THE PAST ROUND MADE IT APPEAR THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEANS
AND CANADA, SUPPORTED BY THE US AS THEIR MAJOR ALLY, WERE
NOT WILLING TO GIVE GUARANTEES OF THIS KIND. THIS WAS THE
MOST NEGATIVE ASPECT OF THE PAST ROUND. TO SUM UP, IN THE
NINTH ROUND THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD MADE NO STEPS FORWARD
TOWARDS THE EASTERN POSITION. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
AND CANADA WERE NOT WILLING TO GIVE THE GUARANTEES THAT THEY
WOULD ACTUALLY REDUCE IN THE SECOND STAGE. THE SOVIETS COULD
REDUCE ONLY IF SUCH GUARANTEES WERE PROVIDED IN A FIRST STAGE.
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FLCNESS ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WAS
NOT MERELY AN EASTERN INTERPRETATION BUT A REAL FACT OF THE
WESTERN POSITION.

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NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

(#) TEXT AS RECEIVED, MBFR VIENNA SECTION I OF 4 CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P 221556Z JUL 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1718

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0414

EXDIS

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FROM US REP MBFR

5. US REP SAID TO REFER FIRST TO THE DATA ISSUE KHLESTOV HAD MENTIONED, IT HAD SEEMD CLEAR TO US REPS, AND APPARENTLY SOVIETS REPS DID NOT DISAGREE, THAT THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES WERE DATA DEPENDENT. IN THE SPRING ROUND, THE EAST AND WEST HAD HAD A LONG SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT, BECAUSE THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES WERE DATA DEPENDENT, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE EAST TABLED DATA. US REP WAS SURE KHLESTOV WOULD RECALL THAT OUT OF THAT DISCUSSION IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT THE WESTERN POSITION THAT IF THE EAST TABLED DATA, THE WEST WOULD CHANGE ITS POSITION. WESTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSLY STATED THE CONTRARY, THAT TABLING OF DATA BY THE EAST WAS NO GROUNDS FOR CHANGING THE WESTERN POSITION SINCE DATA WAS IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST. WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT IF THE EAST WOULD TABLE ITS DATA, THEY WOULD UPDATE THE DATA THEY HAD TABLED EARLIER AND ALSO TABLE DATA FOR AIR MANPOWER. WESTERN REPS HAD MEANT THIS SINCERELY AND HAD THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO IN THE PRESENT ROUND. BUT HE WISHED TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET RP SHOULDN'T ASSUME THAT BECAUSE THE WEST HAD NOT AS YET TABLED DATA, THAT THE WEST HAD CHANGED THE VIEWS WHICH IT HAD EXPRESSED BEFORE THE SOVIET ACTION IN TABLING DATA. WESTERN REPS WERE WORKING ON THE PROBLEM OF GETTING AN ANSWER AND HE
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HOPED THESE EFFORTS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL BEFORE TOO LONG. BUT THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT MISUNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR DELAY. US DEPREP SAID HE WAS SURE THE SOVIETS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE BACKGROUND AND THAT THERE WAS IN FACT NO MISUNDERSTANDING. KHLESTOV GRINNED, BUT DID NOT COMMENT.

6. US REP SAID AS REGARDS THE SECOND SUBJECT RAISED BY KHLESTOV, THE POSITION OF THE TWO SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR REDUCTION APPROACH, AS SOVIET REPS KNEW, WESTERN REPS FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT ADDITIONS TO THE WESTERN POSITION CONTAINED IN THE DECEMBER 16 PROPOSALS HAD BEEN A MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE AND THEREFORE WESTERN REPS STILL LOOKED FORWARD TO A POSITIVE EASTERN RESPONSE. AS TO THE EASTERN FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL, US REPS DID RECOGNIZE THAT IT REPRESENTED A CHANGE FROM THE ORIGINAL SOVIET POSITION AS REGARDS SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS AND A RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. IN THAT SENSE, IT WAS MORE THAN PROCEDURAL, AND IT HAD PROBABLY BEEN A MISTAKE TO CHARACTERIZE IT AS SUCH. HOWEVER, ON THE ISSUE OF PHASING OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE EASTERN FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL HAD NOT DEALT WITH THE TWO CENTRAL ISSUES OF THE WESTERN PHASING POSITION, THE NEED FOR A COMMITMENT BY THE EAST TO AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME AND US-SOVIET FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF THAT OUTCOME. NOR HAD THE EAST MADE ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN ITS REDUCTION APPROACH. THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH STILL CALLED FOR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS BY ALL PARTICIPANTS IN PERSONNEL AND ARMAMENTS AND A BINDING COMMITMENT TO THIS OUTCOME IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

7. US REP SAID TO SUM UP HIS OWN VIEW OF THE NINTH ROUND, IT HAD BEEN USEFUL BECAUSE, IN TABLING DATA, THE EAST HAD TAKEN A STEP WHICH BECAUSE OF THE DATA DEPENDENCY OF THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES SHOULD, ON BALANCE, AS THE DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES PROGRESSE, LEAD TO SOME PROGRESS. US REPS BELIEVED SOVIET REP'S STATEMENTS THAT THE DECISION TO TABLE DATA HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT ONE AND DEMONSTRATED THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. DISCUSSION OF DATA COULD LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE THAT THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES WOULD DEVELOP FURTHER IF THERE WAS A GOOD DISCUSSION OF DATA, BUT PARTICIPANTS WOULD KNOW MORE ABOUT THIS

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POSSIBILITY ONLY AFTER THEY GOT INTO THE DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES.

8. US REP SAID THAT, AS TO KHLESTOV'S REMARKS THAT THE WEST HAD NOT AGREED TO OR INDICATED INTEREST IN A GENERAL COMMITMENT FROM THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE IN THE SECOND STAGE DURING THE PRESENT ROUND, IT WAS IN HIS VIEW A MISTAKE TO CONSIDER THIS A NEGATIVE ASPECT, BECAUSE THIS CONCLUSION OVERLOOKED THE WESTERN VIEW OF WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS ACTUALLY STOOD. WESTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT AFTER THE DECEMBER 16 MOVE THEY WERE JUSTIFIED IN EXPECTING A BIGGER RESPONSE THAN THE EAST HAD YET GIVEN IN THE FORM OF ITS FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSALS.

9. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE WESTERN DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL. SOVIET REPS TREATED US REPS' EVALUATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE PROPOSALS WITH DUE RESPECT. BUT HE HAD TO SAY AGAIN THT THIS PROPOSAL DID NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH SOVIET REPS HAD STATED THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POSITIVE FACTORS IN THESE PROPOSALS. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL HELPED TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND THAT THEY CONTAINED A NUMBER OF POSITIVE ELEMENTS. IT WAS, AFTER ALL, IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PROPOSAL THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD SUCCEEDED IN DEVELOPING THE SOVIET POSITION FURTHER, TAKING A STEP TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION THROUGH AGREEING TO A REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY IN A FIRST STAGE AND THE OTHERS ONLY LATER.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P 221556Z JUL 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1719

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0414

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FROM US REP MBFR

10. KHLESTOV SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS THE COMMON TASK AT THE MOMENT TO THINK OVER WHAT SHOULD BE DONE FURTHER TO MOVE THINGS AHEAD IN FUTURE ROUNDS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. US REP HAD NOTED THAT THE DATA QUESTION WAS UNLIKELY TO BE CONNECTED WITH ANY CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION. BUT BY

TAKING THE STEP OF TABLING DATA, SOVIET REPS HAD THOUGHT IT COULD HELP THE WEST FIND A WAY TO MAKE ITS POSITION MORE FLEXIBLE. NOW THE QUESTION AROSE, WHAT SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED IN THE NEXT ROUND AND IN WHAT AREA COULD ONE LOOK FOR POSSIBLE RAPPROACHEMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS? FROM WHAT US REP HAD SAID ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, KHLESTOV CONCLUDED THAT FOR ONE THING, IN THE NEXT ROUND PARTICIPANTS MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN DISCUSSION ON DATA. IN THIS CONNECTION HE WISHED TO ASK HOW SHOULD SUCH DISCUSSIONS BE CONDUCTED MOST APPROPRIATELY AND WHAT DID US REP EXPECT IN THIS CONNECTION?

11. US REP SAID HE THOUGH THE LOGICAL FIRST POINT OF DISCUSSION OF DATA WAS COUNTING RULES. KHLESTOV AGREED, BUT SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT WISH TO LIMIT DISCUSSION IN THE NEXT ROUND TO DATA ALONG. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FIND SOME WAY OF HANDLING BOTH GENERAL QUESTIONS AND DATA IN A PARALLEL FASHION.

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12. KHLESTOV THEN SAID HE WISHED TO RUN TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE WESTERN DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL WAS EQUITABLE FOR THE SOVIETS. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE: WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY AS PROPOSED BY THE WEST WOULD LEAVE A SERIOUS GAP IN THE EASTERN DEFENSIVE POSITION. WITHDRAWAL OF US SOLDIERS AS INDIVIDUALS WOULD HAVE NO SUCH EFFECT. US REP SAID THAT HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO KHLESTOV IN THE SPRING OF 1974 IN AN INFORMAL SESSION THAT THE WEST DID NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY RESTRICTION ON THE CAPACITY OF EITHER SIDE TO REDEPLOY ITS FORCES WITHIN THE AGREED RESIDUAL LEVELS. THE WEST DID NOT HAVE IN MIND ASKING THE EAST TO SUBSCRIBE TO A SPECIFIC PRINCIPLE WHEREBY ALL EASTERN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF UNITS AND ALL WESTERN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF INDIVIDUALS. IN THE FIRST STAGE, THE US ONLY WISHED TO RETAIN THE FREEDOM TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHETHER ITS REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IN UNITS OR AS INDIVIDUALS. THIS POSITION DID NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE US MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE SOME OF ITS REDUCTIONS IN UNITS. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IF THE US COULD AGREE TO REDUCTION IN UNITS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE TOWARDS A COMMON APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE. US REP SAID ONE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF THOSE COUNTRIES WITH ALL THEIR FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND THOSE OUTSIDE. LIMITATIONS ON COUNTRIES WITH SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT LIMITATION ON THEIR FLEXIBILITY FOR FUTURE FORCE PLANNING. IF THE SOVIETS WANTED AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT AS THEY SAID, THEN THIS FACTOR TOO MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

13. US DEPREP SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET APPROACH FROM THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN UNREALISTIC AND OVERLY AMBITIOUS. IT HAD BEEN UNREALISTIC BECAUSE IT HAD LEFT

TOTALLY OUT OF THE COUNT THE UNDERSTANDABLE APPREHENSION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WITH REGARD TO ENTERING INTO POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS ON FORCE LEVELS. INSTEAD OF TAKING THIS REALITY OF THE SITUATION INTO ACCOUNT AND TAKING POSTIVE STEPS TO DISPEL THESE APPREHENSIONS THROUGH THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION, THE SOVIETS HAD FROM THE OUTSET ACTED AS THOUGH THEY WERE IN A TOUGH BILATERAL NEGOTIATION WITH A NEGOTIATING PARTNER OF EQUAL WEIGHT LIKE THE US. THEY HAD REINFORCED WESTERN EUROPEAN APPREHENSIONS BY MAKING TOTALLY UNREALISTIC PROPOSALS AMONG OTHERS TO THE

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EFFECT THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEANS SHOULD IN THE FACE OF SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THE REDUCTION AREA REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY DISBANDING AND DESTROYING ARMAMENTS WHILE THE SOVIETS WOULD MERELY WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ADD THEM TO THEIR ALREADY VERY LARGE FORCES THERE. THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO ASKING FOR SUCH UNREALISTIC THINGS AS NATIONAL CEILINGS WHICH GRATED ON THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS. ON THEIR RETURN TO MOSCOW, SOVIETS REPS SHOULD REFLECT ON THESE POINTS.

14. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO KEEP THE DISCUSSION SPECIFIC RATHER THAN DEALING WITH THIS GENERAL CRITICISM. SHUSTOV ASKED WHETHER IT WAS EQUITABLE FOR THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA TO HAVE A COLLECTIVE CEILING WHILE A NATIONAL CEILING WAS IMPOSED ON SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. US DEPREP SAID IT WAS JUSTIFIABLE TO PLACE A SUB-CEILING ON THE FORCES OF THE TWO WORLD POWERS IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THERE WOULD BE NO NATIONAL CEILING, IN FACT, NO CEILING AT ALL, ON SOVIET FORCES IN THE SOVIET UNION. KHLESTOV SAID THE ISSUE OF REDUCTION BY UNITS NEEDED MORE STUDY. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE MORE EQUITALE TO THINK IN TERMS OF A REDUCTION ON BOTH SIDES BY SMALLER SIZE UNITS SUCH AS BRIGADES AND REGIMENTS RATHER THAN THE WITHDRAWAL OF AN ENTIRE SOVIET TANK ARMY.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1720

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0414

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

15. KHLESTOV RETURNED TO THE ISSUE OF DATA DISCUSSION. US REP SAID THE BASIC PROBLEM WAS TO UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES IN THE TOTALS FOR BOTH SIDES. THE FIRST PLACE TO LOOK WAS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER BOTH SIDES WERE USING THE SAME COUNTING RULES. KHLESTOV AND SHUSTOV AGREED. US REP SAID ACCORDING TO WESTERN ESTIMATEES THERE WAS A DISCREPANCY OF AT LEAST 150,000 BETWEEN THE EASTERN ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AND WESTERN ESTIMATES OF THOSE FORCES. THE MOST LOGICAL PLACE TO LOOK FOR THE SOURCE OF THOSE DIFFERENCES WAS IN THE COUNTING RULES. KHLESTOV SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME RISK THAT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT GET BOGGED DOWN IN DISCUSSION OF DATA. PARTICIPANTS THEREFORE SHOULD NOT FOCUS SOLELY ON DISCUSSION OF FIGURES. OTHER TOPICS SHOULD BE HANDLED AT THE SAME TIME.

16. KHLESTOV RAISED THE QUESTION OF UNWILLINGNESS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS AND CANADA TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS. US DEPREP SAID HE HAD ALREADY NOTED THAT THE SOVIET POSITION TOWARDS THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WAS WHOLLY UNREALISTIC. THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO CHANCE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS. IT WOULD SIMPLIFY THE NEGOTIATIONS IF THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THIS FACT AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY.

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17. SHUSTOV ASKED WHETHER THE WEST WANTED THE EAST TO REDUCE TANKS IN GENERAL OR IN A TANK ARMY. THE WEST PROPOSED TO REDUCE OLD WARHEADS AGAINST MODERN TANKS. US REPS SAID THEY COULD BETTER DISCUSS THIS TYPE OF ISSUE WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD MADE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN DECEMBER

16 PROPOSAL. US REP SAID IT WAS CLEAR ONE PROBLEM WITH THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WAS THE EFFORT TO REDUCE ALL ARMAMENTS. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO AGREEMENT WOULD INVOLVE A SELECTIVE APPROACH TO ARMAMENTS. IT WAS IMPRACTICAL TO TRY TO DEAL WITH ALL ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD ALSO INCLUDE ARTILLERY WARHEADS. US REP SAID THE WEST WAS UNWILLING TO SPECIFY THE TYPE OF WARHEADS WHICH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. BUT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO LIMIT THE COLLECTIVE TOTAL OF ALL TYPES OF WARHEADS.

18. KHLESTOV SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE ONE REMARK IN CLOSING. THE US SHOULD REALIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS UNWILLING TO REDUCE ITS TROOPS IN THE FIRST STAGE UNLESS IT RECEIVED BINDING ASSURANCE THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD ALSO BE REDUCED IN THE SECOND STAGE.

REPORT TO THE AD HOC GROUP

19. AT THE JULY 20 AD HOC GROUP MEETING, US REP SUMMARIZED THE ABOVE CONVERSATION. US REP SAID DISCUSSION HAD GENERALLY FOLLOWED THE RESPECTIVE LINES SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN BY EASTERN AND WESTERN REPS AT THE JULY 20 INFORMAL SESSION. THERE HAD BEEN NO SURPRISES.

20. WITH RESPECT TO DATA, KHLESTOV STATED THAT HE HAD EXPECTED THE WEST TO TABLE UPDATED NATO FIGURES SHORTLY AFTER THE EAST'S OWN DATA MOVE ON JUNE 10. SOVIET REPS NOW HOPED THAT WESTERN FIGURES FOR NATO MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE COMPARABLE TO THE WARSAW PACT DATA TABLED BY THE EAST WOULD BE FORTHCOMING EARLY IN THE NEXT ROUND. THEY HAD INDICATED THAT THE EAST DID NOT WISH ANY ENSUING DATA DISCUSSION TO MONOPOLIZE THE ROUND, BUT RATHER THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION SHOULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

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21. SOVIET REPS ASKED FOR VIEWS ON THE FORUM AND POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR A DATA DISCUSSION. US REP REPLIED THAT THE QUESTIONS ALREADY PUT FORWARD BY THE WEST CONCERNING EASTERN DATA SHOWED THE DIRECTION IN WHICH WESTERN REPS BELIEVED THE DISCUSSION SHOULD INITIALLY PROCEED. SOVIET REPS AGREED THAT THIS COURSE SEEMED REASONABLE AND THEN INQUIRED ABOUT THE FORUM OF THE DISCUSSION. SOVIET REPS AGAIN AGREED WITH US REP'S VIEW THAT THE DISCUSSION OF DATA SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS WITH MILITARY EXPERTS PRESENT.

22. ON GENERAL ISSUES, US REP SAID SOVIET REPS HAD STRESSED THE EASTERN REQUIREMENT FOR AN EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE THAT

NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD, IN FACT, REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND STAGE BEFORE THERE COULD BE AGREEMENT ON AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS BY SOVIET FORCES. SOVIET REPS HAD ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF REDUCTIONS BY UNITS, CLAIMING THAT THE WEST WAS TRYING IN PHASE I TO SET A PRECEDENT THAT THE EAST WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE IN UNITS BUT THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT. THEY SAID THIS WAS INEQUITABLE. US REP REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN OVER-CHARACTERIZATION OF THE WEST'S POSITION. THE WEST HAD PROPOSED THAT IN PHASE I US SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS. THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY PRECLUDE THE US TAKING SOME OF ITS REDUCTIONS IN UNITS.

23. US REP REPORTED THAT, FOR HIS PART, US REPS HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR REALISM ON THE EASTERN SIDE ALONG THE LINES OF THE JULY 20 WRAP-UP TALKING POINTS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY HAD EMPHASIZED TO SOVIET REPS THAT A REDUCTION OF ALL ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA SIMPLY WAS NOT IN THE CARDS. RESOR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

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Message Attributes

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Draft Date: 22 JUL 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
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From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
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TAGS: PARM, US, UR, NATO
To: SECSTATE WASHDC
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